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FIFTH AMENDMENT-STATUTORY DILUTION OF THE PRIVILEGE
AGAINST SELF-INCRIMINATION
United States v. Apfelbaum, 100 S. Ct. 948 (1980).
United States v. Ward, 100 S. Ct. 2636 (1980).
I. INTRODUCTION
The Supreme Court this year heard two cases
concerning the permissible uses of testimony com-
pelled despite the invocation by a witness of the
fifth amendment privilege against self-incrimina-
tion. The first case, United States v. Apfelbaum,'
addressed the question of the constitutional limits
on the use of testimony compelled under a grant of
immunity under 18 U.S.C. § 6002,2 which pro-
vides that testimony so compelled may not be used
in any criminal prosecution of the witness except
for perjury or false swearing. The second case,
United States v. Ward,3 concerned the extent of pro-
tection afforded by the self-incrimination privilege
against attempts by the government to collect what
Congress has denoted as a civil penalty.
In each case, the holding of the Supreme Court
allows the government broader power in law en-
forcement by expanding the permissible uses of
testimony in situations where the party called upon
to provide information invokes the fifth amend-
ment privilege. This note will analyze the reasoning
of the Court, and the likely impact of that reason-
ing on future decisions.
' 100 S. Ct. 948 (1980).
2 18 U.S.C. § 6002 (1970) reads:
Whenever a witness refuses, on the basis of his
privilege against self-incrimination, to testify or pro-
vide other information in a proceeding before or
ancillary to-
(1) a court or grand jury of the United States,
(2) an agency of the United States, or
(3) either House of Congress, a joint committee of
the two Houses, or a committee or a subcommittee
of either House, and the person presiding over the
proceeding communicates to the witness an order
issued under this part, the witness may not refuse to
comply with the order on the basis of his privilege
against self-incrimination; but no testimony or other
information compelled. under the order (or any
information directly or indirectly derived from such
testimony or other information) may be used against
the witness in any criminal case, except a prosecu-
tion for perjury, giving a false statement, or other-
wise failing to comply with the order.
3 100 S. Ct. 2636 (1980).
II. UNITED STATES V. APFELBAIJM
A. PROCEDURAL HISTORY
Stanley Apfelbaum, an administrative assistant
to the District Attorney in Philadelphia, appeared
as an immunized witness before a federal grand
jury investigating extortion and racketeering. In
the course of his testimony, Apfelbaum denied that
he had tried to locate one Harry Brown in Fort
Lauderdale in December 1975. He also testified
that he did not recall telling FBI agents that he
had loaned S10,000 to Brown.4 These statements
were the basis of a later indictment for perjury. '
In the course of Apfelbaum's perjury trial, the
government introduced a series of excerpts taken
from the transcript of Apfelbaum's grand jury
testimony concerning the degree of friendship be-
tween Apfelbaum and Brown, the circumstances
surrounding Apfelbaum's discovery of Brown in
1976, and other matters. Apfelbaum objected to
the introduction of this testimony. The jury re-
turned a verdict of guilty, and Apfelbaum received
a sentence of two years in prison.6 His appeal to
the United States Court of Appeals for the Third
Circuit charged that the fifth amendment privilege
against compelled self-incrimination precluded ad-
mission into evidence of his immunized grand jury
testimony.
The Third Circuit ruled that the admission of
testimony other than that which constituted the
"corpus delicti" of the indictment was error, and
ordered a new trial.7 The Supreme Court reversed,
holding that the admission of the testimony was
permissible.
B. PRIOR SUPREME COURT DECISIONS
To understand the Supreme Court ruling in
Apfelbaum, a brief outline of the history of the
relationship between the self-incrimination privi-
lege and immunity statutes is helpful. The privilege
arose from the reluctance of the constitutional
4 584 F.2d 1264, 1266 (3d Cir. 1978).
"Id.
6 Id. at 1268.7 Id. at 1271.
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framers to subject those suspected of crime to the
trilemma of self-accusation, perjury, or contempt.
It reflects the fear that self-incriminating state-
ments will be elicited by inhumane treatment,8 as
was the case in the Star Chamber. The fifth amend-
ment provides that "[n]o person ... shall be com-
pelled in any criminal case to be a witness against
himself .... 9
In 1868 Congress enacted the first statute pro-
viding immunity for witnesses.10 This "use" im-
munity statute prohibited the use of any testimony
of a witness against himself in any criminal pro-
ceeding, with the exception of a prosecution for
perjury. Once the witness was granted this immu-
nity, he was no longer in danger of self-incrimina-
tion, as his testimony could not be used to his
detriment in any criminal case. He could not there-
after legitimately refuse to answer on the basis of
the privilege. If he refused to answer, it was in-
tended that he be subject to the sanctions of con-
tempt."
The Supreme Court struck down this statute in
Counselman v. Hitchcock, holding that an immunity
statute, in order to meet the constitutional stan-
dard, must provide protection coextensive with
that of the constitutional provison.' 2 The use im-
munity statute under scrutiny in Counselman failed
because, although it prohibited the use of the
immunized testimony in a criminal prosecution of
the witness, it did not prevent the use of his testi-
mony to search out other evidence to be used to his
detriment in a criminal prosecution. If, however,
he had refused to answer, there would have been
no testimony which could be used to his disadvan-
tage in any way whatsoever. 13 The protection af-
8 Murphy v. Waterfront Commission, 378 U.S. 52, 55
(1964).
9 U.S. CONsr. amend. V.
'0 15 Stat. 37 (1868) provided:
That no answer or other pleading of any party, and
no discovery, or evidence obtained by means of any
judicial proceeding from any party or witness in
this or any foreign country, shall be given in evi-
dence, or in any manner used against such party or
witness, or his property or estate, in any court of the
United States, or in any proceeding by or before
any officer of the United States, in respect to any
crime, or for the enforcement of any penalty or
forfeiture by reason of any act or omission of such
party or witness: Provided, That nothing in this act
shall be construed to exempt any party or witness
from prosecution and punishment for perjury com-
mitted by him in discovering or testifying as afore-
said.
" Counselman v. Hitchcock, 142 U.S. 547, 552 (1892).
121d. at 585.
13 Id. at 564.
forded by the use immunity statute was therefore
not coextensive with that provided by the privilege.
The Court further held that no statute which fails
to secure the witness from being prosecuted crimi-
nally for any matters to which his immunized
testimony may relate would provide the requisite
protection.
14
Following Counselman, Congress enacted a statute
providing "transaction" immunity, which immu-
nized the witness from prosecution for any trans-
action about which he testified.' In Brown v.
Walker,'6 the first Supreme Court decision sustain-
ing a federal immunity statute, the Court held that
a v itness given immunity under the statute has no
right to refuse to answer.1
In Murphy v. Waterfront Commission, "s the Supreme
Court indicated that it no longer held to the Coun-
selman view that an immunity statute cannot grant
protection coextensive with that provided by the
privilege unless the statute provides transaction
immunity. The Murphy court indicated that the
problem of derivative use of immunized testimony
would be satisfactorily resolved by a statute which
prohibited the use of compelled testimony and its
fruits in later criminal prosecutionsO Prosecution
14 Id. at 585.
'5 27 Stat. 443 (1893), provided:
no person shall be excused from attending and
testifying or from producing books, papers, tariffs,
contracts, agreements and documents before the
Interstate Commerce Commission, or in obedience
to the subpoena of the Commission ... on the
ground or for the reason that the testimony or
evidence, documentary or otherwise, required of
him, may tend to incriminate him or subject him to
a penalty or forfeiture. But no person shall be
prosecuted or subjected to any penalty or forfeiture
for or on account of any transaction, matter or
thing, concerning which he may testify, or produce
evidence, documentary or otherwise, before said
Commission, or in obedience to its subpoena, or the
subpoena of either of them, or any such case or
proceeding....
6r161 U.S. 591 (1896).
17 Id. at 610.
18 378 U.S. 52 (1964).
19 Id. at 79. The Court's opinion reads:
[Wle hold the constitutional rule to be that a state
witness may not be compelled to give testimony
which may be incriminating under federal law un-
less the compelled testimony and its fruits cannot
be used in any manner by federal officials in con-
nection with a criminal prosecution against him.
We conclude, moreover, that in order to implement
this constitutional rule and accommodate the inter-
ests of the State and Federal Governments in inves-
tigating and prosecuting crime, the Federal Govern-
ment must be prohibited from making any such use
of compelled testimony and its fruits.
1980]
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for acts concerning which the witness testified
would not be prohibited if based on independent
evidence.
Congress enacted a use/derivative use immunity
statute in 1970.20 The Supreme Court upheld it in
Kastigar v. United States. 21 The Court held that even
though this new statute did not provide the trans-
action immunity which the Counselman Court be-
lieved necessary, it was in accord with the concep-
tual basis of Counselman, that immunity from the
use of compelled testimony and evidence derived
therefrom is coextensive with the scope of the
privilege.H
The Court has since reaffirmed the principle
that the immunized testimony may not be used for
any use or derived use whatever in a criminal trial,
and that the protection afforded must be so "broad
as to have the same extent in scope and effect" as
the-constitutional privilege23 In Mincey v. Arizona,
2 4
decided in 1978, the Court held that "any criminal
trial use against a defendant of his involuntary state-
ment is a denial of due process." 2' The following
term, the Court in New Jersey v. Portash,26 again
held, "[A] defendant's compelled statements ...
may not be put to any testimonial use whatever
against him in a criminal trial. 2 7
The history of the Supreme Court's construction
of immunity statutes shows that from the first
challenge to an immunity statute in Counselman v.
Hitchcock,28 the constitutional standard which must
be met by an immunity statute is as expressed in
the following syllogism:
1. Protection under the immunity statute must
be coextensive with that provided by the invoca-
tion of the fifth amendment privilege.
2. This requires that the witness be left in sub-
stantially the same position as if he had remained
silent.2
3. Any subsequent use of immunized testimony
in a criminal prosecution fails to provide protection
which leaves the witness in substantially the same
position as if he had remained silent.
4. Therefore, any subsequent use of immunized
testimony in a criminal prosecution does not pro-
vide protection coextensive with that provided by
2 See note 2 supra.
21 406 U.S. 441 (1972).
22 Id. at 461.
23 New Jersey v. Portash, 440 U.S. 450, 456 (1979).
2 437 U.S. 385 (1978).
2 Id. at 398.
26440 U.S. 450 (1979).
27 Id. at 459.
2'a 142 U.S. 547 (1892).
29 Id. at 564.
the invocation of the privilege, and is unconstitu-
tional.
Every previous Supreme Court decision to deal
with the constitutionality of immunity statutes had
reaffirmed this standard, until United States v. Ap-
felbaum. 30 Apfelbaum concerned the issue of perjured
testimony following a grant of immunity. The
statute under which the immunity was granted
prohibited the use or derived use of immunized
testimony in any subsequent criminal prosecution
of the witness, with the exception of a prosecution
for perjury. Under the pejury exception, the im-
munized testimony would be admissible.
31
A perjury prosecution is a criminal prosecution;
perjury is a criminal offense. The admission of
immunized testimony in a perjury trial is therefore
irreconcilable with the constitutional standard as
expressed above, which requires that immunized
testimony be excluded from all subsequent crimi-
nal prosecution of the witness. Therefore, either the
syllogism is defective, or the use of immunized
testimony in perjury prosecutions is unconstitu-
tional.
Without the use of the immunized testimony,
subsequent prosecution for perjury following the
grant of imunity would be impossible because suc-
cessful prosecution of a crime where all references
to the criminal act are excluded is unthinkable.
Without the sanction of perjury prosecution, there
is no means of ensuring the reliability of immu-
nized testimony, and the witness may commit per-
jury with impunity. Without the perjury exception,
then, the grant of immunity is futile, the immunity
statute useless.
The Supreme Court in Apfelbaum therefore faced
the dilemma of over a century of affirmation of a
constitutional standard which is irreconcilable with
the perjury exception, without which the immunity
statute cannot function. The Court's options were
to: a) declare that any immunity statute which is
to be effective must also be unconstitutional, b)
modify the requirements of the test of constitution-
ality for an immunity statute, or c) apply the rule
of law in an inconsistent manner.
C. THE REASONING OF THE THIRD CIRCUIT
The Third Circuit ruled that the exception of
perjury prosecutions from the general rule prohibit-
ing the use of compelled testimony in any respect
is justified by the need to preserve the integrity of
the truth-seeking process, and to prevent the wit-
30 100 S. Ct. 948 (1980).
3' See 18 U.S.C. § 6002 (1970).
[Vol. 71
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ness from making a mockery of the immunity
granted.2 The court further ruled that the excep-
tion must be drawn narrowly. This requires that
only so much of the testimony as is necessary to
prove the corpus delicti of the government's case is
admissible.33 The court defined corpus delicti as the
statement or statements of the defendant which the
grand jury has charged to be perjurious, together
with no more than that minimal testimony essen-
tial to place the charged falsehood into its proper
context.34 All the testimony constituting the corpus
deliciti, must be incorporated in haec verba in the
perjury indictment. The rest of the immunized
testimony remains protected by the grant of im-
munity and is inadmissible.3
5
The Third Circuit felt that admission of the
corpus delicti was sufficient to prevent the witness
from making a mockery of the immunity grant.36
Because the exception from the general rule that
the witness must be treated as if he had remained
silent is justified only by the need to prevent the
witness from making a mockery of the proceeding,
and allowing the corpus delicti is sufficient to meet
that need, the extension of the exception beyond
the corpus delicti is not justified.
In explaining that the purpose of the exception
is to prevent the witness from making a mockery of
the immunity grant, the Third Circuit did nothing
to reconcile the exception with the standard from
which it deviates. To say that it is an exception
with a good reason is to say nothing. There may be
many reasons to except various crimes from the
immunity grant, perhaps better reasons than the
protection of the truth-seeking process. Examples
might be the protection of society against murder-
ers and child molesters. But these reasons have not
been adequate to justify the violation of constitu-
tional principles. Rather the Supreme Court re-
gards constitutional principles to be of supreme
importance, upholding them,3 7 even if this means
32 United States v. Apfelbaum, 584 F.2d 1264, 1270
(3d Cir. 1978).33 id.
a4 Id. at 1270 n.9.35 id.
NId. at 1270.
37 Counselman v. Hitchcock, 142 U.S. at 565 ("Legis-
lation cannot detract from the privilege afforded by the
Constitution.... [A] mere act of Congress cannot amend
the Constitution, even if it should engraft thereon such a
proviso'). See also Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643,659 (1961)
("The criminal goes free, if he must, but it is the law that
sets him free. Nothing can destroy a government more
quickly than its failure to observe its own laws, or worse,
its disregard of the charter of its own existence").
setting free arsonists and rapists through the work-
ing of the privilege against compelled self-incrimi-
nation. The Third Circuit gave no indication why
the interest in preventing the witness from making
a mockery of the immunity granted is of such
paramount importance.
The history of immunity statutes indicates the
contrary, that the use of immunity to compel tes-
timony is not important at all. The nation survived
from its inception until 1868 before Congress
passed the first immunity statute. The Third Cir-
cuit's reasoning thus fails to show why the efficacy
of the immunity statute is so important as to justify
a novel deviation from the rule that in cases of
conflict between the Constitution and a statute,
the Constitution must prevail.
The Third Circuit also stated that "It]he Fifth
Amendment privilege does not condone perjury,
... [nor] endow the person swho testifies with a
license to commit perjury. ' ' 18 The cburt cited six
Supreme Court decisions in support of this princi-
ple. "9 Of the six cases, only one, Glickstein v. United
States, concerned perjury following a grant of
immunity. The other cases involved witnesses who
responded to questioning with false answers, but
never invoked the fifth amendment privilege.
The statement that the fifth amendment does
not provide a license to commit perjury fails to
address the issue. The privilege does not provide a
license to commit perjury any more than it provides
a license to commit murder. It does provide a
license to remain silent rather than provide self-
incriminating testimony. Once that privilege is
invoked, the murderer and the perjuror alike must
go free unless the prosecutor finds evidence suffi-
cient to prove his case without the help of the
accused. The fact that, as a practical matter, mur-
derers and perjurors may occasionally go free as a
result, is really an argument against the fifth
amendment itself. The proper remedy for a defect
in an amendment is a further amendment to the
Constitution. If eyeptions to the protections of the
Constitution are made whenever theprotections
are found to be inconvenient, nothing is left of the
constitutional protection.
584 F.2d 1264, 1269 (quoting United States v. Wong,
431 U.S. 174, 178 (1977), quoting Glickstein v. United
States, 222 U.S. 139, 142 (1911)).
9 Id. at 1269-70. The six cases are United States v.
Wong, 431 U.S. 174 (1977); United States v. Mandujano,
425 U.S. 564 (1976); United States v. Kahan, 415 U.S.
239 (1974); Harris v. New York, 401 U.S. 2.22 (1971);
United States v. Knox, 396 U.S. 77 (1969); and Glickstein
v. United States, 222 U.S. 139 (1911).
4o 222 U.S. 139.
1980]
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D. THE REASONING OF THE SUPREME COURT
Justice Rehnquist, writing for the majority, at-
tacked the syllogism itself. He found defective the
second proposition of the syllogism-that the wit-
ness must be treated as if he had remained silent so
that the protection of the immunity may be coex-
tensive with the protection afforded by the invo-
cation of the privilege. He argued that it has never
been the case that immunized testimony must, for
all purposes, leave the witness in substantially the
same position as if he had remained silent.4'
Rather, the fifth amendment requires only that the
grant of immunity leave the witness in the same
position as if he had remained silent for those
purposes which come under the protection of the
privilege.
In defense of the proposition that the immunized
testimony may be used in some situations to the
detriment of the witness, Rehnquist cited several
Supreme Court decisions which establish that civil
proceedings, disgrace, and loss of employment do
not come within the protection of the privilege,43
and that therefore, the immunity statute need not
be designed to prevent these effects from occurring
as a result of the immunized testimony. These
effects may follow consistently with the constitu-
tional protection, though they would not have
occurred had the witness remained silent.44 There-
fore, Justice Rehnquist argued, it has never been
the position of the Court that the witness must be
left as if he had remained silent for all purposes.
Possibly, then, an immunity statute may provide
protection coextensive with that provided by the
privilege, even if it does not leave the witness in
the same position as if he had remained silent. The
salient point, the Court held, is not the effect of
the testimony, but the protection intended by the
self-incrimination privilege. The immunized testi-
mony must not put the witness in a worse position
than he would have been in if he had remained
silent for those purposes which come within the
protection of the privilege. Because civil proceed-
ings, disgrace, and loss of employment do not come
within the protection of the privilege, the grant of
immunity need not protect the witness from them.
41 United States v. Apfelbaum, 100 S. Ct. 948, 954
(1980).
42 Id. at 954.
43 Id. at 954. E.g., Uniformed Sanitation Men Assn. v.
Comm'r of Sanitation, 392 U.S. 280, 284-85 (1968);
Ullman v. United States, 350 U.S. 422, 430-31 (1956);
Smith v. United States, 337 U.S. 137, 147 (1949).
4 100 S. Ct. at 954-55.
Just as civil proceedings, disgrace, and loss of
employment do not come within the protection of
the privilege, prospective acts do not come within
the protection of the privilege. Just as one may not
invoke the fifth amendment privilege to refuse to
answer a question for fear that one will be dis-
graced, so one may not refuse to answer for fear
that he will be incriminated in a crime that he has
not yet committed.4 ' Finally, just as the grant of
immunity does not prohibit the effect of use of the
testimony to cause disgrace, so the grant of im-
munity does not prohibit the use of the testimony
to effect a prosecution for perjury subsequent to
the invocation of the privilege.46
The immunized testimony may therefore be used
in any criminal prosecution for a crime committed
subsequent to the grant of immunity because im-
munized testimony is available for use for purposes
other than those which the fifth amendment priv-
ilege was designed to prohibit. The determination
is whether the privilege could have been invoked
with respect to that use at the time the immunity
was granted.47 Since Apfelbaum could not have
invoked the privilege to avoid self-incrimination
for the crime of perjury at the time the immunity
was granted the immunized testimony may be used
against him at a trial for that act of perjury.
The reasoning employed by Justice Rehnquist
as the underlying rationale of the perjury exception
is equally applicable to criminal prosecutions for
offenses other than perjury, though the Court
found no occasion to reach other offenses in its
discussion. Possibly one item of testimony would
be potentially incriminating for several crimes, and
the grant of immunity would prohibit the intro-
duction of that testimony at a prosecution for one
crime, but allow the same testimony at a prosecu-
tion for the other crimes. As an example, the
statement that one owns a certain gun may be
relevant to a prosecution for a murder and for
armed robbery, both committed with the same
gun-the murder committed the day before the
immmunized testimony, the armed robbery the
day following. If, in the course of the immunized
testimony, the owner of the gun were asked
whether the gun were his, he legitimately could
invoke the fifth amendment and refuse to answer,
as the answer would implicate him in the murder
case. He could not refuse to answer, however, with
reference to his use of the gun in the armed robbery
4 Id. at 956-57.4
rId. at 957.47 Id. at 956.
I[Vol. 71
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which he had not yet performed. If he were granted
immunity and compelled to answer, according to
the Court, his answer could not be entered in
evidence at the trial for those crimes which he had
already committed at the time the immunity was
granted. The testimony would be admissible, how-
ever, in a trial for the armed robbery committed
after his testimony. Thus, the same immunized
testimony would be inadmissible in one criminal
prosecution, but admissible in another.
The Court's reasoning refutes the long-standing
principle that a grant of immunity must prohibit
any use of the immunized testimony in any crimi-
nal prosecution. Since the statute in Apfelbaum pro-
hibits the use of any immunized testimony in any
criminal prosecution, with the exception of prose-
cution for perjury, there was no occasion to apply
the broader implications of the Court's reasoning.
Rehnquist's discussion was not in terms of a narrow
exception for the purposes of protecting the integ-
rity of the immunity transaction, but rather in
terms of a comprehensive standard which redefines
the scope of immunity which must be granted by
an immunity statute. The new standard would
require that "the testimony [remain] inadmissible
in all prosecutions for offenses committed prior to
the grant of immunity that would have permitted
the witness to invoke his Fifth Amendment privi-
lege absent the grant.' ' Exceptions to such im-
munity are to be construed as "narrow" excep-
tions.49
If such narrow exceptions are permissible, then
Congress may enact a statute which provides that
"no testimony ... compelled under [an] order [to
testify following invocation of the Fifth Amend-
ment privilege] ... may be used against the witness
in any criminal case, except a prosecution for
offenses committed subsequent to the grant of im-
munity.' ' 5 Such an immunity statute, under the
reasoning ofJustice Rehnquist, would provide pro-
tection coextensive with that required by the fifth
amendment, and would therefore be permissible.
Justice Brennan wrote a concurring opinion,
arguing that the logic and exigencies of the perjury
exception require that the government be permit-
ted to introduce portions of the immunized testi-
mony other than the corpus delicti to prove perjury,




s This hypothetical statute is modeled after the pro-
vision in 18 U.S.C. § 6002 which creates the perjury
exception.
immunized testimony to the corpus delicti should for
that reason be overturned.r1
Justice Brennan did not see any contradiction
between the perjury exceptioft and the accepted
constitutional standard that the immunity must
leave the witness in the same position as if he had
remained silent. He found two justifications for the
perjury exception. First, prior to the immunity
grant the witness had no fifth amendment right to
answer falsely. False statements are therefore out-
side the protection of the privilege, and immunized
statements may be used to prosecute them. '2 The
second justification is that the perjury exception is
necessary to protect the integrity of the immunity
transaction.5 Because these reasons are adequate
to support the perjury exception, Justice Brennan
would contend the analysis by Justice Rehnquist
was too broad, and was unnecessary.
54
But the reasons advanced by Justice Brennan
are identical to those of the Third Circuit, and are
unsatisfactory. The first justification, that the fifth
amendment gives no right to answer falsely, does
not address the issue, which is not whether the
accused has the right to perform his illegal act, but
whether his compelled testimony may be used to
convict him for that act. The fifth amendment says
that it may not. The second justification adds
nothing to the first. The Constitution does not
require an effective immunity statute. It does re-
quire that no one be compelled to testify against
himself in a criminal case. If judicial construction
of the protections of that rule are to be modified in
order to render statutes efficacious, there will be no
end to the modifications, but a rather quick end to
the protections of the Constitution.
Justice Blackmun's concurring opinion recog-
nized the problem of reconciling traditional con-
stitutional analysis with the perjury exception. He
argued that even though the rule that the witness
must be treated as if he had remained silent has
exceptions, this does not justify the abandonment
of the rule.55 The perjury exception is unique be-
cause perjury violates the basic assumption on
which the privilege and hence the immunity de-
pends-that the witness will provide truthful tes-
timony. Thus it differs from all other instances in
which the witness's testimony might be used.s6
5i 100 S. Ct. at 958.
is Id.
53 id.




Because Justice Blackmun found this sufficient to
dispose of Apfelbaum, he did not reach the broader
reasoning used by Justice Rehnquist.
Perhaps the concurring opinions provide some
limits to Justice Rehnquist's willingness to broaden
the exceptions to the privilege against self-incrim-
ination. That test could come very quickly if Con-
gress follows the direction Justice Rehnquist points
to when it drafts its next immunity statute.
II. UNITED STATES V. WARD
A. PROCEDURAL HISTORY
United States v. Ward'7 arose over a violation of
33 U.S.C. § 1321, which provides for penalties
against those who discharge oil or other hazardous
substances into navigable waters. The person re-
sponsible for the discharge is required by law to
report it, and failure to do so is a criminal violation
that carries the possibility of fine and imprison-
ment. The notification received may not be used
for any purpose against the notifying party except
a prosecution for perjury or giving a false state-
ment.
The statute expressly sets out a civil penalty of
not more than five thousand dollars for each of-
fense. The amount of the penalty is based on
considering the size of the business of the owner or
operator charged, the effect on the operator's abil-
ity to continue in business, and the gravity of the
violation.ss Under guidelines issued by the Com-
mandant of the Coast Guard, factors determinative
of the gravity of the violation include the degree of
culpability, the prior record of the operator, and
the amount of oil discharged.5 9 Substantial and
intentional discharges, as well as cases of gross
negligence, result in more severe penalties. How-
ever, the responsible party cannot avoid or reduce
the civil penalty by removing the discharged oil-
his effort and expense in cleaning up are not to be
considered.r ° The proceeds from penalties are put
into a fund established to help pay clean-up costs
for unpunished spills, and administrative costs in-
curred in enforcing the penalty. The operator, in
addition to the penalty, is liable for clean-up
costs.
6 1
Oil from an oil retention pit operated by Ward
seeped into Boggie Creek in Enid, Oklahoma, vio-
57 100 S. Ct. 2636.5833 U.S.C. § 1321(b)(6) (1977).
59 United States Coast Guard Commandant Instruc-
tion 5922.11A (1973).60 id.
61 Id.
lating the statute. Ward reported the seepage to
the Environmental Protection Agency, who for-
warded the report to the Coast Guard, who assessed
a five-hundred-dollar penalty. Ward lost an ad-
ministrative appeal, then filed suit in the United
States District Court, 62 claiming that the reporting
requirement violated his fifth amendment privilege
against compelled self-incrimination.
The District Court found that the penalty was
civil in nature, and therefore outside the protection
of the fifth amendment, whereupon Ward ap-
pealed to the United States Court of Appeals for
the Tenth Circuit.63 The Tenth Circuit found that
the penalty was criminal, and that the fifth amend-
ment privilege was applicable, whereupon the gov-
ernment appealed to the Supreme Court. The
Supreme Court, in another opinion by Justice
Rehnquist, held that the penalty was civil, and
that the fifth amendment privilege was not avail-
able to Ward.
B. PRIOR SUPREME COURT DECISIONS
Ward, by claiming that a penalty which had
been designated by Congress as a civil penalty was
in fact criminal, and that he was therefore entitled
to the fifth amendment protection against self-in-
crimination, raised an issue which goes back to
1886, when the Court decided Boyd v. United
States. 64 In that case, the Supreme Court recognized
the danger that, because the self-incrimination
privilege extends only to criminal cases, and not
civil proceedings, the legislature may designate as
"civil" proceedings actions which are in fact crim-
inal prosecutions, thereby avoiding the due process
requirements of the fifth amendment, and depriv-
ing the accused of his self-incriminat on right.65 If
the distinction between civil and criminal proceed-
ings is left to the unrestricted determination of the
legislature, then the fifth amendment protections
are illusory, i.e., subject to avoidance or even an-
nihilation at the legislature's discretion. There
must, therefore, be objective content to the term
"criminal case" sufficient to distinguish it from the
term "civil case." The Boyd court indicated that,
for the purposes of the self-incrimination privilege,
the term "criminal case" included cases involving
forfeiture of property.6
62 Ward v. Coleman, 423 F. Supp. 1352 (W. D. Okla.
1976), rev'd, 598 F.2d 1187 (10th Cir. 1979), rev'd sub nom.
United States v. Ward, 100 S. Ct. 2636 (1980).
6 598 F.2d 1187 (10th Cir. 1979).
6 116 U.S. 616 (1886).
6 Id. at 634-35.
6 Id. at 634.
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In 1937, the Court held in Helvering v. Mitchell 7
that Congress may impose civil sanctions, without
recourse to judicial power or the requirements of
the fifth amendment, to ensure payment of taxes
and tariffs.'a The Court found that the crucial issue
in determining the civil or criminal character of a
sanction is whether the sanction is punitive or
remedial in purpose."0 The Helvering Court found
that sanction to be remedial because its purpose
was to secure full compensation to the government
for the expense of enforcing the law. The same
behavior (tax fraud) which gave rise to the civil
penalty was also subject to criminal sanctions. The
Court stated that Congress might legitimately im-
pose both civil and criminal penalties for the same
behavior,70 and that this did not indicate that the
civil penalty was a criminal penalty in disguise.
In 1960 the Court decided Flemming v. Nestor,7'
in which it held that a punitive design is determi-
native of the criminal nature of a proceeding. The
determinative factor was whether the penalty im-
posed an affirmative disability or restraint. The
Court further stated that "only the clearest proof
could suffice to establish the unconstitutionality of
a statute on such a ground. 72 Unmistakable evi-
dence of punitive intent must be found before it
would strike down the Congressional enactment. 73
In 1963, the Court in Kennedy v. Mendoza-Marti-
nez74 suggested a test for punitive intent based on
seven factors used in previous cases: 1) whether the
sanction involves an affirmative disability or re-
straint, 2) whether it has historically been regarded
as a punishment, 3) whether it comes into play
only on a finding of scienter, 4) whether its opera-
tion will promote the traditional aims of punish-
ment-retribution and deterrence, 5) whether the
behavior to which it applies is already a crime, 6)
whether an alternative purpose to which it may
rationally be connected is assignable for it, and 7)
whether it appears excessive in relation to the
alternative purpose assigned.75 The Court recog-
nized that the determination of whether a statute
provides for civil or criminal penalties is an ex-
tremely difficult problem and one elusive of solu-
tion, and that these seven factors may often point
67 303 U.S. 391 (1938).
r' Id. at 399.
6Id at 400 n.3.
70 Id. at 399.
71363 U.S. 603 (1960).
72 Id. at 617.
73 Id. at 619.
74 372 U.S. 144 (1963).
75 1d. at 168-69.
in differing directions.7" The Mendoza-Martinez
Court did not apply those seven factors. Rather, it
found that the objective manifestations of congres-
sional intent conclusively showed the challenged
penalty to be punitive, which rendered analysis
77under the seven factors unnecessary.
Two years later, in One 1958 Plymouth Sedan v.
Pennsylvania,78 the Court found that Boyd controlled
a situation where a civil penalty requiring the
forfeiture of a sedan worth one thousand dollars
was invoked in lieu of criminal prosecution which
carried a maximum fine of five hundred dollars.
The Court held that it would be anomalous to
apply the protections of the fourth amendment
when attempting to enforce the lesser criminal
penalty, but not to apply them when attempting
to enforce the greater penalty which was nominally
civil.79 The Court found the penalty too excessive
to be civil, and required the application of the
fourth amendment protections.
In 1972, the Court decided One Lot Emerald Cut
Stones v. United States, 80 stressing the factors concern-
ing excessiveness of the penalty and the previous
criminality of the behavior. The Court found that
the penalty was not excessive, but rather indicated
a remedial purpose, as it was reasonably related to
the investigation and enforcement expenses of the
government.8 ' The previous criminality of the ac-
tion also indicated the civil nature of the penalty
because Congress had clearly and intentionally
distinguished the two types of penalty within the
statute.&
2
Finally, in 1978, in Bell v. Wolfish, 3 the Court
cited Mendoza-Martinez to the effect that the civil,
as opposed to criminal, purposes of a statute will
generally turn on "whether an alternative purpose
to which [the restriction] may rationally be con-
nected is assignable for it, and whether it appears
excessive in relation to the alternative purpose
assigned [to it].""
This review of the history of the distinction
between civil and criminal penalties indicates that
no single test has been used. Different factors are
used in different cases; perhaps a different test is
applied in each case. Because the viability of the
76 id.
77Id at 169.78 380 U.S. 693 (1965).
7Id at 701.
80 409 U.S. 232 (1972).
l Id at 237.
8 Id. at 236.
8 441 U.S. 520 (1979).
8 Id at 538 (quoting Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez,
372 U.S. at 168-69).
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self-incrimination privilege is dependent on the
application of the test for determining whether
proceedings are criminal or civil, a coherent and
reliable test is essential. Such a test has not emerged
from the above-mentioned Supreme Court deci-
sions.
C. LOWER COURT REASONING
In Ward v. Coleman,8 the district court and the
Tenth Circuit both relied on the test outlined in
Mendoza-Martinez, but with conflicting results. The
District Court found that Mendoza-Martinez indi-
cated a civil penalty, the Tenth Circuit that it
indicated a criminal penalty.
Of the seven factors set forth in Mendoza-Martinez,
two relate to the behavior penalized: whether the
penalty comes into play only on a finding of scien-
ter, and whether the behavior to which it applies
is already a crime. The district court observed that
the penalty is assessed regardless of scienter, and
that this factor points to a finding that 33 U.S.C.
§ 1321 is remedial.' The Tenth Circuit found that
the amount of the penalty varies according to the
culpability and intention or negligence of the party
penalized, therefore indicating a scienter require-
ment, and hence a criminal penalty. 7 The issue
thus raised by the differing interpretations of the
two courts is whether the fact of the penalty itself,
or the amount of the penalty, was to be the basis
of the scienter factor.
The second factor relating to the behavior pe-
nalized is that of whether the behavior to which
the penalty applies is already a crime. In Ward, the
same behavior penalized by the five-hundred-dol-
lar fine was subject to criminal punishment under
33 U.S.C. § 407. However, 33 U.S.C. § 1321(b)(6)
provides that the information required for the pur-
poses of the civil penalty may not be used for the
purposes of prosecution un.der the criminal section
of the statute. The district court, therefore, found
that this factor does not indicate that the penalty
is punitive!ss The Tenth Circuit found this distinc-
tion irrelevant, holding that the factor indicated a
criminal penalty. 9
The other five factors in Mendoza-Martinez are
concerned with the penalty provided by the statute
under scrutiny, and are: "Whether the sanction
involves an affirmative disability or restraint,
8 423 F. Supp. 1352.
86 423 F. Supp. at 1356.
87598 F.2d at 1193.
88423 F. Supp. at 1357.
89 598 F.2d at 1193.
whether it has historically been regarded as a
punishment, ... whether its operation will pro-
mote the traditional aims of punishment-retri-
bution and deterrence, . .. whether an alternative
purpose to which it may rationally be connected is
assignable for it, and whether it appears excessive
in relation to the alternative purpose assigned
..... 9 The district court and the Tenth Circuit
both found that the factors of affirmative disability
or restraint and historical characterization are rel-
atively useless in determining the character of a
monetary penalty.91 The factors found crucial by
the two courts were those relating to the purpose
of the sanction. The district court found that such
factors, i.e., whether the operation of the statute
promotes retribution and deterrence or is grounded
in some alternative purpose, indicate a civil pen-
alty, while the Tenth Circuit found that they in-
dicate a criminal penalty.
The different conclusions resulted from different
analyses. The district court found that the statute
had an incidental deterrent effect, but that this
was a legitimate part of a regulatory scheme.
92
Congress' real intent, as indicated by the use of a
penalty to pay the Act's administrative costs and
the costs of clean-up, was to clean up the nation's
waters.93 That is, the purpose of the act turned on
an analysis of the uses to which the proceeds of the
penalty were put. Because the proceeds are used
for remedial purposes, the purpose of the act was
held to be remedial.
The Tenth Circuit found the purpose of the
penalty in the method of assessing it. Because the
defendant is liable to pay the costs of cleaning up
the oil spill even without the civil penalty, the
assessment of the civil penalty bears no relation to
clean-up costs.9 The penalty varies according to
the culpability and the prior record of the party
responsible, and the gravity of the violation, and
thus has the effect of retribution ' Because the
factors used in assessing the penalty have no rea-
sonable relation to the damage done, the alterna-
tive purpose of compensation for damage is not
present. The penalty, therefore, was held to be
excessive in relation to any legitimate alternative
96purpose.
90 Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez, 372 U.S. at 168-69.
91423 F. Supp. at 1356; 598 F.2d at 1193.
92423 F. Supp. at 1356.
9 Id.
9 598 F.2d at 1193.
95 d. at 1193-94.
96 1d. at 1194.
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The issues raised by the lower courts, then, are
1) whether the scienter requirement factor is deter-
mined by analysis of the behavior which triggers
the penalty, or by analysis of the method of assess-
ing the amount of the penalty; 2) whether the
factors relating to the purpose of the penalty are
analyzed with reference to the method of assessing
the amount of penalty or with reference to the uses
to which the penalty is put; and 3) the significance
of whether the behavior penalized is already a
crime. The two lower courts differed sharply in
their interpretation of these factors, with each court
drawing support from earlier Supreme Court de-
cisions. The viability of the fifth amendment pro-
tection against compelled self-incrimination is de-
pendent on the existence of a dispositive test for
determining the civil or criminal nature of a pen-
alty, therefore the clarification of these issues by
the Supreme Court would have been very helpful.
Unfortunately, Justice Rehnquist's opinion did not
resolve the conflict.
D. THE SUPREME COURT REASONING
Justice Rehnquist's opinion in United States v.
Ward97 stated that, given congressional intention to
establish a civil penalty, only the clearest proof of
a punitive purpose or effect could suffice to estab-
lish the unconstitutionality of the statute. Justice
Rehnquist found that Congress, by labelling the
sanction as civil, intended to establish a civil pen-
alty.9s
Justice Rehnquist then noted that the factors
listed in Mendoza-Martinez were useful, though "cer-
tainly neither exhaustive nor dispositive."': The
Court found that only the factor concerning
whether the behavior penalized is already a crime
supported the conclusion that the penalty was
punitive. Moreover, even though the behavior pe-
nalized is criminal, the force of this factor was
diminished by the fact that the civil and criminal
penalties were contained in statutes enacted sev-
enty years apart.1 °
The Court did not engage in further analysis of
the Mendoza-Martinez factors, but simply held a
finding of prior criminalization of the penalized
behavior was not sufficient to support a finding
that the penalty was punitive, and that therefore
the requirement that he provide information ren-
dering him liable to the penalty did not violate his
97 100 S. Ct. 2636.
"Id. at 2641.
99Id.a
" °Id at 2641-42.
privilege against compelled self-incrimination. 0
Thus the case did nothing to clarify the proper
function of the Mendoza-Martinez test, and actually
undermined it by finding that the test is neither
exhaustive nor dispositive on the issue of whether
a penalty is criminal for the purposes of the fifth
amendment.
The Court then turned to an analysis of the test
in Boyd v. United States,'02 where it was held that
forfeiture is a sanction sufficiently criminal to trig-
ger the self-incrimination privilege. The Court dis-
tinguished Boyd on two grounds: first, that the
penalty in Boyd had no relation to damages sus-
tained by society or the cost of enforcing the law,
while in Ward, the penalty was more analagous to
traditional civil damages; 03 and second, that the
proceedings in Boyd posed a danger that those
penalized would prejudice themselves in respect to
later criminal proceedings, while the information
provided by Ward could not be sed in later
criminal proceedings."04
The first basis for distinction between Boyd and
Ward relied on by the Court concerns the same
issue inherent in the Mendoza-Martinez consideration
of whether the purpose of the statute is retribution
and deterrence or some alternative purpose. The
issue in the lower courts was whether the determi-
nation of the function of the penalty was to be
made by investigation of the method of assessing
the penalty, or by investigation of the uses to which
the penalty is put.' 0' The Supreme Court in Ward
found that the penalty was related to compensation
to society for damages sustained, but did not ex-
pressly state the basis for its determination of this
finding. Because the penalty is assessed iii addition
to clean-up costs, it is unrelated to the damages to
the environment caused by defendant. Because the
factors determining the amount of the penalty are
the culpability of the party, his ability to pay, and
the gravity of the violation, the penalty doesn't
appear to be related to administrative costs. In
fact, the only basis for the finding that the penalty
is related to enforcement costs and clean-up costs
appears to be the fact that the penalty is placed in
101 Id. at 2642.
102 116 U.S. 616.
103 100 S. Ct. at 2643.
'04 Id. at 2644.
'00 The district court determined that the penalty was
remedial because it was used for enforcement and clean-
up costs. 423 F. Supp. at 1356. The Tenth Circuit found
a retributive purpose in the fact that the factors used in
assessing the penalty tended to promote the ends of
retribution. 598 F.2d at 1193.
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a fund which is used for clean-up expenses in those
spills where the responsible party has not been
found, and for the administrative costs of enforcing
the penalty. If this is the basis of the finding of a
remedial purpose, then any monetary penalty
whatsoever may be related to damages to society
and enforcement costs, and may, therefore, be
found to be remedial in purpose. A fine for bribery
or theft need only be placed in a fund to pay
enforcement costs, and that fine would be related
to damages to society and enforcement costs. The
penalty would, therefore, be civil, and the one
accused of theft or bribery would not be entitled to
invoke the fifth amendment privilege against self-
incrimination. Requiring that the penalty be used
for administrative costs is thus no guarantee that
a penalty is not assessed in avoidance of a criminal
penalty, but rather that it is a legitimate civil
penalty.
The second ground of distinction between Boyd
and Ward relied on by the Court is equally flawed.
The Boyd Court was not concerned that those
penalized would be prejudiced in later criminal
proceedings, but that the prosecutor would elect to
take by civil proceeding in lieu of the criminal
action.' °6 The prosecutor, finding that he cannot
marshal enough evidence to secure a conviction
without the evidence provided by the defendant,
may choose to enforce the desired penalty through
a civil proceeding, where the evidence of the de-
fendant may be compelled. This danger is not
eliminated by the grant of immunity in future
criminal proceedings. The distinction between Boyd
and Ward relied on by the Court is therefore irrel-
evant. The danger that the legislature will establish
civil penalties to avoid the requirements of due
process cannot be avoided by requiring that the
information compelled in enforcing the civil pen-
alty be prohibited from use in enforcing a criminal
penalty, or by requiring that the civil penalty be
used to pay damages to society or administrative
costs. The danger may be averted only by the
establishment of a clearly defined standard which
distinguishes criminal proceedings from civil pro-
ceedings.
'°6Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. at 634:
If the government prosecutor elects to waive an
indictment, and to file a civil information against
the claimants-that is, civil in form-can he by this
device take from the proceeding its criminal aspect
and deprive the claimants of their immunities as
citizens, and extort from them ... a confession of
guilt? This cannot be. The information, though
technically a civil proceeding, is in substance and
effect a criminal one.
The Court in Ward failed to establish such a test.
The Court undermined the test used by the lower
courts, first by stating that the test was neither
exhaustive nor dispositive, secondly by failing to
resolve, or even address, the problems faced by the
lower courts in the application of the test. Having
undermined the Mendoza-Martinez test, the Court
did not establish a new test, but merely ruled that
the Congressional intent to establish a civil penalty
may be overcome only by the clearest proof of
punitive purpose or effect. In most cases, however,
no clear or precise test is available to measure the
intent of Congress or the effect of the statute. The
Court therefore has given Congress the broadest
possible latitude to avoid the requirements of the
self-incrimination privilege, and to enforce penal-
ties without meeting the rigorous standards of due
process.
II1. CONCLtUSION
In United States v. Apfelbaum, the Supreme Court
addressed a contradiction inherent in prior deci-
sions. One line of cases required that a witness
compelled to testify under a grant of immunity
after he had invoked his fifth amendment privilege
against self-incrimination must be left in the same
position as if he had remained silent, and that this
required his immunized testimony to be excluded
from any use in future criminal prosecution of him.
Another line of cases supported provisions of im-
munity statutes which allow the use of immunized
testimony in prosecutions for perjury or false swear-
ing. The Court in Apfelbaum refuted the require-
ment that the witness be left as if he had remained
silent, and ruled that the immunity statute need
leave the witness in the same position as if he had
remained silent only for those purposes for which
the fifth amendment could have been invoked at
the time the immunity was granted. The Court
further held that the witness cannot invoke the
fifth amendment privilege for actions not yet per-
formed at the time immunity was granted. Because
the perjury had not been performed at the time
immunity was granted, it does not come within the
protection of the privilege, and so the privilege
does not require that the protection of the immu-
nity extend to a prosecution for that perjury.
The implication of the new reasoning advanced
by the Court is that immunized testimony would
be admissible in prosecutions for any offenses com-
mitted after the grant of immunity.
In United States v. Ward, the issue was the distinc-
tion between criminal and civil cases. The Court
found that the test announced in Kennedy v. Men-
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doza-Martinez did not establish by clear proof that
the civil penalty assessed against Ward was so
punitive as to render the penalty criminal for the
purposes of the fifth amendment privilege against
self-incrimination. The Court did not address the
problems faced by the lower courts in applying the
test, and therefore left the lower courts with no
certain test to apply to legislative enactments to
ensure that civil penalties are indeed civil, and are
not denominated as civil penalties to avoid the
requirements of the self-incrimination privilege.
Both cases involved a determination of the extent
to which compelled information may be used
against one facing a sanction. In Apfelbaum, the
Court's clearly defined modification of earlier case
law greatly expanded the possible uses of testimony
compelled under a grant of immunity. In Ward,
the Court's reasoning was not clearly defined, and
it is this very lack of definition which potentially
expands the discretion of the legislature in com-
pelling information by the device of establishing
civil penalties. By establishing a civil penalty rather
than a criminal penalty, the government may com-
pel information which renders the defendant liable
to sanctions, whereas if the penalty were a criminal
penalty, the information could not be compelled.
The two cases thus provide two devices for the
compulsion of testimony which otherwise would
not be available to the prosecution of the witness
because of the fifth amendment privilege against
compelled self-incrimination.
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